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Some Ancient Notions of Boredom
PETER TOOHEY
There is no need to apologise for a discussion of ancient concepts of
boredom. Through fifteen hundred years of Western culture the notion of
boredom has been a vital one. Ranging from dark age and medieval
monastic acedia, from the "English disease" of the seventeenth, eighteenth
centuries and the French Enlightenment, from the mal de siecle of
nineteenth century Europe, to the "nausea" and alienation of twentieth
century existentialists and Marxists, the concept has had a long and powerful
history.' It is a history, furthermore, of literary and sociological
significance. (As much felt, that is, as written about.) The topic did not
have the same importance for the ancients as it does for modems. Yet there
are references to the concept in ancient literature. These provide the
justification for my paper.
In spite of its ubiquity the notion of boredom—in ancient or modem
literature—is very hard to pin down. The meaning seems to shift with the
centuries and, even within these centuries, to shift according to the
sensibility and the age of the person using it. It is, however, a notion
which most eras take for granted. Definitions, therefore, must come first.
The concept of boredom cannot be isolated in ancient contexts unless we are
sure of that to which we are referring. Here are some of the definitions
which are currently in use.^ The bulk of these are, because of the obvious
danger of anachronism, inapplicable to the ancient world. Thoroughness,
however, demands at least a partial listing.
1
. A sense of boredom or simple tedium may be the result of, say,
being shut up too long. It is also the case that people can be as "boring" as
situations. In people an excess of long-windedness, for example, or an
unwilHngness to vary a long practised routine is often described as "boring."
' See Kuhn's book cited in Note 2 and M. Bouchez, L'ennui: de Sineque a Moravia (Paris
1973).
^Some of these definitions may be found in R. Kuhn's The Demon ofNoontide: Ennui in
Western Lilerature (Princeton 1976)3-13.
152 Illinois Classical Studies, XIII. 1
(A "bore," of course, may also be a person who is judged socially inept or
socially inferior.)
2. Kuhn describes a state which he terms horror loci} Typically this
state of mind is seen in a rich man who hurries to his country house only to
become bored with this. He then hurries quickly back to his city house
where the same thing happens all over again. This state of restless
dissatisfaction does not necessarily imply the more "spiritual" conditions
described below. Indeed it may indicate nothing more than a low tolerance
to boredom of the type described above.
3. There is another type of boredom, sometimes described as a spiritual
boredom or ennui, which can infect a whole life. In some cases horror loci
could be seen as a manifestation of this condition. This type of emotion is
perhaps more familiar from the literature of the nineteenth century where it
was termed the mal de siecle. It has had a sort of an afterlife in the
conditions suffered by Roquentin in Sartre's La Nausee or by Mersault in
Camus' La Peste, or by Dino, the protagonist of Moravia's La Noia. Such
conditions are surely related to alienation in the Marxian sense—reification
as it is sometimes called. This is the sort of thing which an assembly line
worker may suffer."
4. There is also depression.^ In the psychological sense depression (or,
as Aristotle termed it, melancholy) can resemble boredom or ennui. But
they are not really the same thing. The ancients and the modems view
depression as an illness and do not confuse it with boredom. Spleen, the
"English Disease" prevalent in eighteenth century England and in the French
Enlightenment, is perhaps more readily identifiable with depression. So too
is acedia, the monkish "demon of noontide," that destructive sense of
depression so feared by the medieval cleric. Depression and melancholy,
since they are to be distinguished from boredom, are not to be the subject of
this paper.
Such a listing, as is obvious, is procrustean and exclusive. (Where, it
might be queried, is Durkheim's anomie? Can simple boredom not result
from depression?) Yet without some attempt at the categorisation of the
emotion of boredom any attempt to discuss its ancient manifestations is
^See Kuhn, op. cit. in Note 2, 23. Kuhn does not state whence the term is derived. It seems
to resemble such "English" Latin as horror vacui (on which see the entry in the OED) for which
it could be a rough sort of antonym. The condition, at least in ancient literature, is alluded to
more than once. Kuhn's term, which I will use henceforth, seems to me to be as good as any
other.
* The "bored housewife" syndrome is probably irrelevant here. Kuhn (op. cil. in Note 2, 7)
links this to a type of sense deprivation: "unconscious goals, aspirations and ideals ... are
maintained in this stale of boredom, but the ability to reach them is interfered with by the
repression of these goals and the rejection of substitutes that all seem inadequate."
^ For histories of which see R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy
(London 1964), and Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholy and Depression: From Hippocralic Times
to Modern Times (New Haven 1986). Worth consulting in a more general sense is Bennett
Simon, Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece (Ithaca 1978).
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doomed. In the following pages some of the contexts in which boredom is
alluded to will be discussed. The intention is to determine in what ways, if
any, such contexts mirror the conceptualisations of the emotion which are
reproduced above.
Perhaps at the very outset a list of the ancient terms used to describe
boredom is in order. Their location in a text will help to focus the
discussion. In Greek there is ak\)q and its verbal forms dA.iDco,
dXv)O0aiv(o, dX-oooco, dXuoxd^coetc, and nouns (and their verbal forms)
such as dndGeia, dioiSia,^ dnXtioxia, doTj, Kopoc;, nX'r\o\iovr\ or, in some
contexts, verbal forms such as dvidco, evox^eco or Tpvxpdco. In Latin there
are words such as taedium and related forms, fastidium and related terms,
otium, satietas and related forms, vacare.fatigo, defatigo, defetiscor etc.,
torpor and related forms, languidus and related terms, desidia, inertia, ineptia,
piget and related forms, hebes and related forms, obtundo, molestus,
odiosus, odium, vexo and so on. The list could be extended, but, as is
probably obvious, most of these terms are mere approximations.^ They do
allow, however, a few conclusions to be drawn. The term used to describe
"boredom" in Greek is not at all common and, with the sense of "boredom,"
is late. Taedium is the best of the Latin terms, but it lacks concision. Its
lexical ambit is far wider than the English "boredom" (or, for that matter,
terms in modem languages such as I'ennui, la noia or Langweile). Speaking
lexically, therefore, the ancient notion of boredom was not a precise one.
But this observation needs to be tested against the ancient descriptions.
In Greek of the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods, references to
boredom are very hard to find. They are, furthermore, conjectural. Here is a
fairly typical example. It is from Plato, Symposium 173c, and occurs soon
after the beginning of the dialogue. After stating that he knows of nothing
which gives him greater pleasure than discussing philosophy, Apollodorus
continues to say: . . . lovq vp-ziipovq Toix; tcov nXoxiaiav Kal
XpTiiiaTio-ciKciiv, amoq xe d^Qonai v^iac, xe xohq kxaipovq eXew, oxi
oiEoGe XI noiEiv otjSev 7ioiotivxe<;.
Dover^ interprets the use of the word dx9o)i.ai in this context as
"bored," This is doubtless correct, but it remains an interpretation:
"wearied" or even "annoyed" might have done. Notice too that Dover's
imputed sense of "being bored" here is comparable only to the simple
emotion described as number one above. It would be incredible to maintain
that Greeks did not feel such an emotion.
*I doubt that this word can be satisfactorily included within this list, notwithstanding the
famous medieval sense. The sole example which may be relevant is Cic. ad All. 12. 45. For
the problems associated with the word in this context see Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero's tellers to
Alticus. vol. 5 (Cambridge 1966) 337-38.
^ In some contexts yawning might denote boredom. One could add to the list, therefore,
xdoKO) in Greek, and in Latin oscilo, oscitalio and hio.
'In his Plato: Symposium (Oxford 1980) 79.
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In Pindar (and frequently in oratorical literature) a fear is expressed that a
lengthy text may induce in the listener the emotion of Kopoq. At first sight
the word may seem to imply boredom. Closer examination will show that,
as with Plato, such an assumption is conjectural. Here from Pindar,
Pythian 1. 81-83, is a typical reference to this fear:'
Koipov ei (pGey^aio, jtoXA-cov Tteipaxa ovvxavuaaK;
ev ppaxei, neitov e'jteTai |i(ono(; dvGpco-
Tccov dcTto yap Kopoc; duPXwvei
aiavTji; taxeiai; eXmbaq-
What is the state of mind referred to here? Does "satiety" entail "boredom"
or "weariness?"'" Or could it even entail, as Burton' ' maintains, "some sort
of offensive action." The Kopoi; may be the product of excessive long-
windedness, which may produce weariness. Or such fulsome praise may
rouse the envy of the audience and thus bring hostility against the addressee.
In other contexts the result of K6po(; may be the weakening of the force of
the speaker's argument (defence, accusation, request etc.).'^ It is not easy to
decide which emotion is being appealed to. All three emotions may be
referred to. The point, however, is that in Pindar (and in later contexts) the
emotion is not made precise. Having only words upon which to make
deductions one must conclude that the imprecise labeUing meant, as far as
boredom is concerned, an imprecise perception of the emotion. Pindar and
the orators, therefore, offer no help.
Two other passages which may profitably be compared are Iliad 24. 403
and Euripides, Iphigeneia in Aulis, 804-08. Both passages are instructive
in a negative way. Both describe situations which, on first reading, seem to
allude to boredom. Indeed, boredom might be expected in such situations.
Yet, on closer reading, neither context mentions the emotion. This may
well indicate the regard in which this mental state was held. In the former
Hermes, pretending to be one of Achilles' Myrmidons, is speaking to
Priam. He states that the Achaeans will begin fighting the Trojans at dawn.
' Other examples may be seen at Pythian 8. 32, at Nemeans 7. 52 and 10. 20.
'" Eur. Med. 245 offers an analogous instance but uses the word acrn • Medea is in the midst
of her great monologue on the role of women in Greek society:
avfip 8', btav toiq evSov axQlxai ^uvcov,
'itfn (ioXuv ena-ooE Kap5iav datiq.
Whether acni refers to "satiety," "weariness" or plain "boredom" is impossible to say. (Notice
too the use of axSonai).
" See Pindar's Pythian Odes (Oxford 1962) 107: "The risk of Kopo; is always present in his
thoughts: it is not merely a passive state of mind in an audience but a positive emotion that
may issue in some sort of offensive action." On the rhetorical force of KOpo? see E. L. Bundy,
Studio Pindarica. UCPCP, 18 (1962) 13, 40. 74 ff.
'^The lopos had a long history. Compare, from amongst the many possible examples,
Isocrates, Panegyr. 7; Ovid, Pont. 3. 7. 3; Seneca, Ep. Mor. 100. 11; Quintilian, Inst. Or. 8. 6.
14; 10. 1. 31 and Rutilius Namatianus, de red. 2. 3. This rhetorical topos never clearly
distinguishes between boredom, weariness and offence.
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They have had enough of waiting (aaxaXoaai yap oi5e Ka0Ti|ievoi).
Their leaders can no longer restrain them. One might have expected Hermes
to express some notion of boredom here—it might be expected to be
implicit in KaGrmevoi. Yet a.axaX6(oa\. is a precise word. It demonstrates
that the soldiers were not "bored," but vexed at having to wait. We might
have preferred them to be bored. In the passage from the Iphigeneia at
Aulis, Achilles has just come on stage and addresses the chorus. He asks
for Agamemnon and seems to complain about the delays they are enduring,
bottled up at Aulis. These are his words:
o\)K e^ iao\) yap nevo|iev E-upiicou ntKaz,.
ol |xev yap tihwv ovxeq a^\)ye(; ydncov
oiKOVi; EpTifiov<; EK^iiuovxeq evGdSe
9doao\)o' ETi' dKtai(;, ol 5' e'xovxei; Ei5vi5a(;
Kttl TtaiSaq.
The key words are Gdooo-oo' en' d)cxai(;, which are occasionally interpreted
as referring to the boredom of being bottled up. Yet, on closer examination,
this does not seem to be what Euripides is saying. The soldiers may be
sitting by the shore; but their attitude is likely to be one of impatience to
get on with the war and to get back to their deserted homes which will need
their care. Boredom, in both passages, seems latent in the descriptions. Yet
this is not what was really chosen for emphasis.'^
Recourse to the dictionary listed occurrences of akx>c, or dX-uco casts no
doubt upon the suspicion that for Greeks of this period boredom was a
neglected emotion. The LSJ offers two early uses of the word where the
meaning seems to be "boredom" or "ennui."''' The first comes from the
Epicurean philosopher Metrodorus.'^ Metrodorus links the verb dX-oco with
the words enl tqv ouiikooicov. The context is fragmentary but Metrodorus
seems to be referring to the tedium which can be induced by a bad drinking
party. Lacking a context it is difficult to state anything with confidence.
Yet here it seems not unreasonable to interpret the reference to boredom as
being of the simple type. Zeno, as reported by Clement of Alexandria (von
Amim, SVF i, p. 58), uses the word in a manner which may be appropriate
to simple boredom, or so suggests the LSJ. To judge from the following
lines it may be better to gloss the word ak\>c^ as "annoyance": dneoxco 8e
Kttl 6 dno t5)v |i\)poncoX.(cov Kal xpuaoxoeicov Kai epioTtcoXicov akxic,
Kttl 6 djto Tcbv aXkwv epyaoTTipCcov, ev9a e'caipiK(b(; KEKoonrnievai,
cooTiep (a'l) ETtl -ceyoix; KaSe^onevai, Siimepeijovoi.
Taken on their own the passages and contexts discussed above can prove
nothing. The knowledge, however, that the contemporary term for boredom
" Compare Plutarch, Eumenes 1 1—which is discussed below. Here Plutarch makes much
of the boredom suffered not just by the cooped up soldiers, but also by the cooped up animals.
'* Epicurus (fr. 496) may refer to the emotion, if not use the term oXy><^. See Note 34 below.
'' Papyrus Herculanensis, 831. 13, ed. A. Korte.
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was rarely used, and that the mental state was rarely described or alluded to,
does allow us to note a tendency to ignore the emotion. Perhaps judging it
trivial, Greeks of these periods did not dignify it with frequent reference.'^
For the first unequivocal description of boredom we have to wait for
Lucretius. Lucretius DRN, 3. 1053-75''^ is a famous passage. Its depiction
of the anxious, bored lives of the Roman rich'* was imitated later by Horace
and by Seneca. Lucretius' ennui-ridden individual tires of being at home,
goes out, returns again dissatisfied; he hurries from his city house to his
country home to escape the sense of anxiety and ennui only to find the same
experience awaiting him in the country. The key lines are DRN, 3. 1060-
67:
exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille,
esse domi quern pertaesumst, subitoque <revertit>,
quippe foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse,
currit agens maimos ad villam praecipitanter,
auxUium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans;
oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae,
aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit,
aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit.
Lucretius seems to blame the unsettled emotions of his wealthy Roman on
a fear of death." Presumably Lucretius means that the desire for a change of
place of habitation reflects a hope that novelty will assuage or distract the
fear of death. That horror loci is being described is manifest. That
boredom is at issue is made obvious by the use of the words oscitat.
Lucretius' diagnosis of the cause of horror loci is doubly interesting. It
may demonstrate his unwillingness to accept that such a simple emotion as
boredom could cause such havoc in a life. Thus it may reinforce the
suspicion that boredom was not a state taken very seriously in the ancient
world. Furthermore Lucretius DRN, 1053-75, being such a confident
portrait, suggests that the emotional state of his wealthy man was not
uncommon. Bailey^" remarks that "boredom and restlessness were a
'* Arist., Ach. 30 has Dicaeopolis, as he wails for the assembly to convene, listing a series
of discomforts. Amongst the words appears the perfect tense of xaoKCO-
cxEvoj KEXT|va OKOpSivoinai nep6o(iai,
(XTtopM 7pd(p(B TtapttTiWonai XoYi^ofiai.
It seems to me most probable that this is a reference to boredom (cf. ctTtopoi).
" According to Klibansky, op. cit. in Note 5, 356. in the tract on melancholy of Agrippa of
Nettesheim, Lucretius is said to be a melancholic (as are Hesiod, Ion, Tynnichus of Chalcis and
Homer.) The assertion is unprovable. However, it makes more sense than the assertion of
Kuhn, op. cit. in Note 2, 25 ff., that Lucretius was subject to ennui.
'* Their probable wealth is stressed by Kenney, Lucretius, De rerum natura: Book III
(Cambridge 1971)239.
" So BaUey, Titi Lucreli Cari De rerum natura libri sex (Oxford 1947) vol. 2, 1 171, and
Kenney, op. cit. in Note 18, 239.
^ Op. cit. in Note 19, vol. 2, 1171.
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characteristic of Roman life at the end of the Republic and the beginning of
the Empire." Whence he drew this information I am unsure—though
doubtless his observation is correct in spite of the paucity of contemporary
evidence. Yet the passage must point to its prevalence. It deserves to be
noted, however, that in spite of the probable prevalence of this type of
emotion, Roman literature of this and later periods makes few references to
the emotion. 21 That in itself is surely significant. The Roman valuation
matches that of the Greeks. The experience may have been another matter.
At this point attention must be directed backwards, chronologically
speaking, to an important relic of one of Ennius' plays, the otium fragment
from the Iphigenia. From an historical point of view this fragment ought
to have been treated before Lucretius, antedating the DRN as it does by well
over one hundred years. Its imputed purpose, a description of horror loci, is
simpler to judge when viewed in the light of Lucretius' unequivocal
description.^^ The sense of v. 199-202 of this fragment may point to the
type of emotion whose symptoms Lucretius inveighs against in the Roman
rich. The fragment (XCIX, v. 195-202 in Jocelyn) follows:
otio qui nescit uti
plus negoti habet quam cum est negotium in negotio.
nam cui quod agat institutum est fin illisf negotium,
id agit, <id> studet, ibi mentem atque animum delectat suum;
totioso initiot animus nescit quid velit.
hoc idem est: em neque domi nunc nos nee militiae sumus.
imus hue, hinc illuc; cum illuc ventum est, ire illinc lubet.
incerte errat animus, praeter propter vitam vivitur.
Otium could conceivably be interpreted here as boredom—although the use
is doubtless punning. The chorus of soldiers may be telling us that otium
("ease") can quickly become "boring" or "wearying" (oliosum). Thus it is
with them. They go here and there (like Lucretius' rich man) but cannot
settle {incerte errat animus) nor derive satisfaction from life (praeter propter
vitam vivitur). It needs to be observed, however, that the manuscript
readings are crucial. Jocelyn's text,^^ reproducing the codices, tends to
remove the sense of "boredom" by reproducing the less comprehensible
reading otioso initio rather than Lipsius' widely accepted otioso in otio?^
^' As a rhetorical demonstration of this point we could point, for example, to Cicero's letters
of 59, say, Att. 6. 9 and 11, which do not mention or describe boredom. One might have
expected them to. Similarly one might have expected Ovid in Tomis to be consumed by the
emotion. Yet his Epistulae ex Ponio contain no such references (cf. Ex Ponto 1 . 5. 8, 43-44; 3.
4. 57).
^ Farquharson in his The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (Oxford 1944) vol.
2, 514, imphes the link between this passage and Lucretius.
" Which is the one reproduced here: The Tragedies ofEnnius (Cambridge 1967) 1 12 and 333
ff.
On this fragment and otium see J. -M. Andrfi, Recherches sur I'otium romain (Paris 1962),
and, more generally, L'otium dans la vie morale el inlellectuelle romaine (Paris 1 966). See too
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As read above the fragment seems to have more to do with laziness (a "lazy
beginning?") or indecisiveness than with boredom. When one makes a lazy
start, the fragment could be saying, one does not know where one is. Begin
indecisively then things continue that way and a task becomes laborious.^^
The chorus of soldiers could be referring, therefore, not to any sense of
horror loci (which seems unlikely in their occupation) but to the
indecisiveness which has overtaken them due to poor initiation and
direction.26 It is doubtful, therefore, that this fragment offers any assistance
in pinning down Roman notions of boredom.
Horace, perhaps unlike Ennius, seems to reflect Lucretius' description
of horror lociP In Stoic or Epicurean contexts such as Satires 2. 7. 28-29,
in Epistles 1. 8. 12; 1. 11. 27 and 1. 14 Horace inveighs against the
victims (himself included) of this type of ennui. Satire 2. 7 reports a
dialogue between Horace and one of his slaves, Davus. Taking advantage of
the freedom of speech allowed slaves during the Saturnalia, Davus upbraids
his master for philosophical pusillanimity. The basic notion of the poem is
that only the wise man is free. Davus the slave is in fact the true free man,
while free Horace is in reality a slave. One of Davus' demonstrations of
Horace's lack of freedom hinges upon horror loci: this is expressed in v.
28-29. Like Lucretius' wealthy man, Horace is unable to find contentment
in either the city or the country.
Romae rus optas, absentem rusticus urbem
tollis ad astra levis.
The emotion, not perhaps as acute as that described by Lucretius, is none
the less of the same order. In Epistles I. 14 it is Horace giving the advice,
this time to his vilicus, who longs for the excitements of the city life which
he has willingly abandoned for the farm. The dissatisfactions which
Horace's slave feels are a type of horror loci and are comparable to those
denounced by Davus in Satires 2. 1. Note also that the solution to the
problem of the vilicus, according to Horace, is hard work. The implication
Jocelyn, op. cil. in Note 23, and O. Skutsch. Sludia Enniana (London 1968) 157-65 (a reprint of
his Rh.M. 96 [1953] 193 ff. article.)
" The reading olioso inilio is defended by R. J. Baker. "Well begun, half done: olium at
Catullus 51. 13 and Ennius, Iphigenia," forthcoming. Baker interprets the phrase as an ablative
of attendant circumstances and cites Cic. de leg. 3. 37 (hoc populo etc.) as a comparable
construction. The reading does produce a scanable half line (the first two melra of this trochaic
septenarius are comprised of two trochees followed by two anapaests) provided one allows hiatus
between initio and animus.
^Exactly the same point could be made of the use of otium in the final stanza of CatuUus
51. Here indecisiveness or laziness could have been the trouble rather than boredom. (See R. J.
Baker, "Propertius' Monobiblos and Catullus 51," Rh.M. 124 [1981] 312-24.) If one accepts
Lipsius' emendation, however, it is a different matter. Horace, Odes 2. 16, seems to refer neither
to boredom, laziness nor indecisiveness. See Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford 1957) 21 1 ff.
^ See Kenney, op. cit. in Note 18, 241.
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is that the emotion is normal and doubtless afflicts many. Horace does not
suggest that it is a result of a fear of death.
Epistles 1.11, addressed to a Bullatius, who was travelling abroad and,
the poem seems to suggest, who was prone to the disorder described in DRN
3. 1053-75, again uses the image of horror loci. Like Epistles 1. 8, which
will be discussed shortly, this poem presents Bullatius' problems as
symptomatic of a larger problem. V. 25-30 summarise:
. . . nam si ratio et prudentia curas,
non locus effusi late maris arbiter aufert,
caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt.
strenua nos exercet inertia: navibus atque
quadrigis petimus bene vivere. quod petis hie est,
est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus.
The (strenua) inertia —a synonym for laedium—is certainly a form of
boredom, but one whose consequences are most apparent in horror loci.^
The solution to the problem is the exercise of ratio and prudentia and the
resultant possession of an aequus animus. The cure is philosophical. It
needs to be stressed that Horace's opinion of horror loci seems to differ from
that of Lucretius. The incessant desire for change, which this emotion
reflects, is symptomatic for Lucretius of a deeper malaise, the fear of death.
Novelty distracts one from the fear, whilst sameness is inclined to encourage
it. Horace does not appear to see anything so sinister in horror loci. For
him it is a typical human emotion which can be cured by common sense
and hard work.
Epistles 1. 8. 11-12 seems to continue the idea. Here it is Horace
describing himself:
quae nocuere sequar, fugiam quae profore credam;
Romae Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam.
In this short poem, however, Horace's inability to be content with his lot is
the result not so much of a lack of philosophical conviction as of his own
psychology. In v. 9-10 he describes himself as locked into a perverse frame
of mind which generates the horror loci:
fidis offendar medicis, irascar amicis,
cur me funesto properent arcere vetemo.
Whether Horace's condition is better characterised as ennui or depression
(melancholy) is a moot point.^' I believe that it is melancholy, not ennui.
^The notion is also picked up in Odes 2. 16. 18-20: quid terras alio calentis I sole
mutamus? patriae quis exsul I se quoquefugiCl
^ Klibansky, op. cil. in Note 5, 50, reports Rufus of Ephesus, who wrote not much later
than Horace, as describing a melancholic as "bloated and swarthy; plagued by all maimer of
desires, depressed . . .; cowardly and misanthropic; generally sad without cause, but sometimes
immoderately cheerful; given over to various eccentricities, phobias and obsessions." Is this
160 Illinois Classical Studies, XIII.l
What is important is that the emotion (here termed metaphorically as
veternus)^'^ has been complicated and expanded to the point that it has
become almost spiritual. The condition, alternatively, is close to that of the
seventeenth century melancholy, spleen, or to that of the nineteenth century
ennui. As in so many instances, however, no clear-cut reference to boredom
is apparent.
In Seneca's writings the notion of boredom appears frequently. Its
range of connotations is broad and seems to stretch from simple boredom to
a type of boredom which reflects that described by Horace in Epistles 1. 8.
Boredom can become so all
—
pervasive as to sour one's whole approach to
life. Similarly broad is Seneca's use of the key term taedium: the word can
mean anything from "disgust" or "weariness" through simple boredom to
full-blown ennui. Seneca's perception of the emotion, speaking textually,
represents something new.
Simple boredom is referred to, for example, at A'ar. Quaest. 4 A. Praef.
2, and at Ep. Mor. 40. 3. 6 and 70. 3. 7. The latter pair may be cited as
representative. Speaking of a style of speech which is too slow Seneca
suggests that the "boredom" (or "weariness") caused by halting speech
induces an audience to lose interest: nam ilia quoque inopia el exilitas
minus intentum auditorem habet taedio interruptae lardilatis. ... In the
second passage, Ep. Mor. 70. 3. 7, Seneca is using a nautical metaphor. He
contrasts the reactions of sailors to slow and to speedy voyages. Sailors
trapped into the first type of passage are wearied by the boredom induced by
the windlessness: alium enim, ut scis, venti segnes ludunt ac detinent et
tranquillitatis lentissimae taedio lassant, alium pertinax flatus celerrime
perfert. Notice that the term used here for boredom is We^/Mw.^' Such a use
of the word taedium is clearly linked to its common use meaning
"weariness" or "disgust."^^
Seneca repeats some of the notions of horror loci which are familiar
from Lucretius and Horace. One could cite, above all, Ep,.Mor. 28, which
refers specifically to Horace, Epist. 1. 11. 27, and expands. Stoic fashion,
on this notion throughout the letter. The opening couple of sentences of
the letter are indicative of the theme of the whole: hoc tibi soli putas
accidisse et admiraris quasi rem novam, quod peregrinatione tam longa et tot
locorum varietatibus non discussisti tristiam gravitatemque mentis?
Horace? Ross S. KUpatrick, The Poetry ofFriendship: Horace, Epistles 1 (Edmonton 1986) 38-
39 argues that Horace is the victim of melancholy.
'" Kiessling-Heinze, begging the question, compare dicriSia in Cic. adAtt. 12. 45, on which
see Note 6 above.
'' The OLD (s.v. taedium) allows the meaning "ennui" for taedium only when it stands
without the genitive. This seems to me to be unnecessarily prescriptive. This is especially so
in the case of the second of the two citations above. A meaning "boredom" seems as apposite.
'^ See amongst others, Ep. Mor. 56. 9. 5; 59. 15. 8; 100. 11. 5; de ira 3. 1. 5. 6, or de
beneficiis 2. 5. 2. 7; 2. 1 1. 6. 2; 6. 16. 6. 2 or 7. 2. 4. 2.
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animum debes mutare, non caelum .... The theme is repeated with
variations in ad Helv. 12. 3. 4, where Seneca refers to the extremes to which
the rich will go to avoid taedium. In this case they vary their bored lives by
imitating the poor: nee tantum condicio illos temporum aut locorum inopia
pauperibus exaequat; sumunt quosdam dies, cum iam illos divitiarum
taedium cepit, quibus humi cenent el remoto auro argentoque fictilibus
utantur?^ Somewhat the same theme is repeated in Ep. Mor. 18. 7. 3,
where the rich are seen to attempt to escape taedium through luxury.
Seneca, though a professed Stoic, seems to have more in common with
Lucretius than Horace. In Ep. Mor. 28 the cause of horror loci is seen to
be a fear of death. Novelty can distract from this fear, but the real cure rests
in the eradication of fear through philosophy.
Boredom (or taedium as Seneca usually terms it) can spoil a whole life.
Seneca seems fully conversant with the emotions described by Horace in
Epistles 1. 8 and with the larger problems indicated by Lucretius' horror
loci. The invasive taedium which produced the horror loci outlined above is
one example. The emotion outlined in Ep. Mor. 24 seems stronger again.
It can be so powerful as to lead to suicide. The passage {Ep. Mor. 24. 26),
though lengthy, requires quotation in full.
Quosdam subit eadem faciendi vivendique satietas et vitae non odium sed
fastidium, in quod prolabimur ipsa inpellente philosophia, dum dicimus:
"Quousque eadem? Nempe expergiscar dormiam, <edam> esuriam, algebo
aestuabo. Nullius rei finis est, sed in orbem nexa sunt omnia, fugiunt ac
sequuntur. Diem nox premit, dies noctem, aestas in autumnum desinit,
autumno hiemps instat, quae vere conpescitur: omnia sic transeunt ut
revertantur. Nihil novi facie, nihil novi video: fit aliquando et huius rei
nausia." Multi sunt qui non acerbum iudicent vivere, sed supervacuum.
(Notice that in this passage the word taedium does not appear. It is replaced
by satietas, fastidium and, most remarkably, by nausia).^ Seneca's portrait
of boredom has taken the pervasive, souring but limited emotion of
Lucretius and Horace to its logical extreme. Horror loci has become so
severe that it influences all portions of life. The victim is left with but one
alternative: multi sunt qui non acerbum iudicent vivere, sed supervacuum.
This can only be suicide.
" Compare Ep. Mor. 100. 6 and Martial 3. 48.
^ The term taedium is used earlier in the letter (24. 22): Obiurgat Epicurus non minus eos,
qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: "Ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio
vitae, cum genere vitae, ut currendum ad mortem esset, effeceris." The sense is the same. The
quotation is reproduced by Usener, Epicwea (repr. Rome 1966) as fr. 496 of Epicurus' remains.
It would be useful to know what Epicurus said and to have a context. This might alter the
conclusions concerning the earlier Greek conceptions of the emotion. As it stands, Seneca may
be guUty of distortion.
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Before leaving Seneca perhaps some mention should be made of the
fascinating dialogue de tranquillitate animi?^ The dialogue is addressed to a
young Annaeus Serenus, who complains of a condition which, at the outset
of the dialogue, seems to resemble at times melancholia at times boredom.
Soon afterwards (1. 4) the emphasis of the dialogue shifts from the
physiological to the moral. Serenus complains that he is unable to chose
between a life of luxury and a life of frugality, between a public and a
private life, and so on. In spite of frequent references to taedium vitae and
displicentia suP^ the thrust of the dialogue is to diagnose and to correct this
state of mental equivocation and to replace it with a state of philosophical
tranquillity. The concern of the dialogue is only tangentially with boredom.
It is, after Seneca, Plutarch who provides the most useful set of
references to the notion of boredom.^'' To judge from the occurrences of the
word aXvq, he preserves part of the range of the meanings evident in
Seneca. There are in Plutarch several references to the simple form of
boredom.^* Eumenes 11. 3 provides the clearest example. In this passage
the effect of the close confinement of besieged forces is described and
Eumenes' attempts to alleviate the feeling of akvc, which was taking hold
of the soldiers. The crucial clause is this: . . . oij novov tov aXw autSv
UTto
-cfii; anpa^iac, ^apaivo|X£vcov anaX'kaE,a\ pot>X6|iEvo(;, dXXa Kai
. . . Here boredom is the result above all of inactivity (dnpa^la). Like
taedium the word also may have the sense of "distress" (see Brut. 5) or even
"depression" (see Mar. 78). As far as I can see, however, there are no
common references in Plutarch to horror loci.
Perhaps the most startling reference to boredom occurs in Pyrrhus 13.
Pyrrhus, after becoming regent of Epeirus and later of Macedonia, withdrew
from the latter possession in disappointment at the disloyalty of his
subjects. It was in description of this point of his life that Plutarch makes
his reference to "boredom." The passage deserves quoting in full:
Toxe 5' o\)v eii; "Hjteipov EKiteoovxi xcp FIvippM koI Ttpoenevco
MaKeSoviav ti hev x-uxti Ttapeixe xpfjoGai xoii; napoiiaiv
ditpaynovwc; xai ^fiv ev eipT|VTi, PaoiXevovii tmv oIkeicov 6 5e
TO \ir\ napixziv exepoii; Koxd |i.ri5' e'xEiv -ixp' exepcov aA.-uv xivd
vavxitoSTi voni^mv, moTiEp 6 'AxiA-^ix; o\)k fc'cpEpE xtiv axoA.T|v . .
Boredom—to the point of nausea—did not allow Pyrrhus to enjoy his
retirement. He was only content, according to Plutarch, when doing or
receiving mischief. To alleviate the boredom Pyrrhus launched himself on a
new round of military activities at the end of which he lost his life.
'' Kuhn, op. cit. in Note 2, 31, insists incorrectly that the concern of this dialogue is ennui.
See too Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford 1976) 322.
'* See, for example, 2. 6. 2; 2, 10. 2; 2. 11. 4; 3. 1. 1; 3. 6. 2 and 17. 3. 7.
^ Other instances, but scattered ones, exist. See, for example. Martial 12. 82. 14, which
refers to the boring importunities of a man seeking a dinner invitation.
'* Amongst others one could cite Eum. 1 1, An/. 5\,Pyrrh. 16, Tim. 14 and Rom. 5.
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Boredom, therefore, and its avoidance is seen as the motivating force in
Pyrrhus' life. Whether or not Pyrrhus is telling us historical truth is
irrelevant—nor do we have any means of ascertaining the state of Pyrrhus'
psychology. What is vital is Plutarch's perception of the emotion.
Boredom, like the mal de siecle, has become a spiritual malady and is seen
as capable of devouring a whole life.
The century following Plutarch, as expected, provides further references
to boredom. There is, for example, Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 25 Chilton)
referring to the fickle and bored manner in which passers-by read his work.
Or Aelian {Varia Historia 14. 12) singling out the king of Persia who, to
avoid boredom when travelling, kept a knife and a piece of linden wood for
whittling. Farquharson, the editor of Marcus Aurelius, argues for the
presence of a reference to ennui, precisely horror loci, in 2. 7 of the
Meditations?'^ The passage is as follows:
nepiOTtai x{ at xa e^coGev enjiinxovxa; Kai oxoXtiv Ttapexe aeauxcoi
1QX) jtpoo|iav6dvEiv dyaGov xi Kai TtaiJaai pEjiPonevoi;. r\hT[ hi. ko
TTiv exepav jiepicpopdv (pv^aKxeov A-Tipoviai ydp Kai 5id Ttpd^ecov o
KEKHTiKOXEi; xwi p{(oi KOI ^iTi e'xovxei; okoiiov, £<p' ov Ttdaav opufiv Ka
KaGdita^ (pavxaoiav d7CE-v)6t)vo\)aiv.
The expression o'l kek^tikotec; tmi Picoi may indeed be a very condensed
way for describing the aimless Roman aristocrat. The expression, however,
does not allow of easy interpretation. It may well refer to a spiritual ennui.
That it may also refer to horror loci is uncertain.
As a topic worthy of serious consideration boredom must wait for the
fourth century, the next period of great cultural revival. Reference in this
period, however, has inexorably been altered by Christianity. The focus,
through the work of men such as the Christian mystic Evagrius or of St.
John Chrysostomos, is now on the deadly sin of acedia, the depressed
condition which led anchorites to despair of god."" It has been indicated
previously that acedia may better be considered as depression. But
demonstration of this point is beyond the scope of this paper.
There are several conclusions which may be drawn from this brief
survey. The first and most obvious is that the ancients were subject to
boredom. But there are qualifications which need to be made to this
assertion. Greek literature down to the Hellenistic period lacks reference to
anything more than the simplest form of boredom. Indeed the word
boredom only seems to appear in the fourth century. Serious or unequivocal
consideration of boredom begins in the first century B.C. in Rome, but here
it is limited to the less complex form of horror loci. It is in the first and
second centuries A.D. that a spiritual form of boredom is first referred to.
This is apparent in the works of Seneca and then Plutarch. Boredom in
" Farquharson, op. cit. in Note 22, vol. 2, 514.
*° The most recent discussicxi of this topic is conuined in Jackson, op. cit. in Note 5, 46-77.
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Seneca is seen as an emotion which effects not only sporadically but can
spread to influence one's every waking action. It can become a spiritual
disease. Plutarch, to judge from his life of Pyrrhus, was quite familiar with
the concept. In Seneca and Plutarch, therefore, there seems to be the
beginnings of the modem concepts of the emotion. Why the early empire
should mark the inception of such an emotion is another question.
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